



Negotiating the European Constitution: Actor Cleavages and Bargaining Outcomes

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Overview

- Expected **Actor Cleavages** in Negotiations on the European Constitution
- Information and Data on **Actor Preferences**
- **The European Convention:**
Patterns of Actor Collaboration
- **Explaining Actor Preferences**
 - Model (Example)
 - Operationalization of Independent Variables
 - Selected Results
- **Distance to Negotiation Outcomes**

Expected **Cleavages** in Negotiations on the European Constitution

- Government **left-right location** ('comparative politics perspective')
- **Length of EU membership** ('socialization effect' or 'constructivist' perspective)
- Member state **population size** (cleavage 'large versus small')
- Relative **wealth** ('North-South' cleavage)

Information and Data on Actor Preferences


- **Public opinion:** Eurobarometer
- **Political parties:** party manifestos
- **Convention delegates:** texts submitted to the European Convention
- **Government preferences:** project 'Domestic Structures and European Integration' (DOSEI)


The European Convention: Patterns of Actor Collaboration

- Convention conducted between 28 February 2002 and 10 July 2003;
- During Convention process, 6474 contributions were submitted by 197 distinct speakers, located in 28 different countries;
- Example: article 3 (goals of the EU).

Overview of Convention Membership

FIRST NAME	SURNAME	MEMBER STATE	DELEGATION	DOMESTIC PARTY	FULL PARTY NAME	PARTY FAMILY	EP GROUP	WORKING GROUP
Anne	VAN LANCKER	B	EP	SPA	Socialist Party Different	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Lone	DYBKJAER	DK	EP	RV	Radical Left	4	ELDR	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Pervenche	BERÈS	F	EP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
M.Josef	CHABERT	B	CoR	CD&V	Christian Democratic and Flemish	6	EPP	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Manfred	DAMMEYER	D	CoR	SPD	German Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Patrick	DEWAELE	B	CoR	VLD	Flemish Liberal Democrats	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
Claude	du GRANRUT	F	CoR	UMP	Union for a Popular Movement	6	EPP	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Claudio	MARTINI	I	CoR	DS	Left Democrats	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Ramon Luis	VALCARCEL SISO	E	CoR	PP	People's Party	6	EPP	Not in Working Group
Paul	HELMINGER	L	NP	PD	Democratic Party	4	ELDR	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Jacques	SANTER	L	Gov	PCS	Social Christian Party	5	EPP	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Nicolas	SCHMIT	L	Gov	tech	Technocrat	N	NA	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Renée	WAGENER	L	NP	Greng	Greens	1	GREENS	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Gaston	GIBERYEN	L	NP	ADR	Action for Democracy	1	EPP	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Ben	FAYOT	L	NP	POSL	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Caspar	EINEM	A	NP	SPÖ	Austrian Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Maria	BERGER	A	EP	SPÖ	Austrian Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Not in Working Group
Jürgen	MEYER	D	NP	SPD	German Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Evelin	LICHTENBERGER	A	NP	ÖGr	Greens	1	GREENS	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Kimmo	KILJUNEN	FIN	NP	SDP	Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Adrian	SEVERIN	RO	NP	PSD	Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Robert	MACLENNAN	GB	NP	LibDem	Liberal Democrats	4	ELDR	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Vytenis	ANDRIUKAITIS	LT	NP	LSDP	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Jacques	FLOCH	F	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Not in Working Group
Jozef	OLEKSY	PL	NP	SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Genowefa	GRABOWSKA	PL	NP	SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	3	PES	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Gintautas	SIVICKAS	LT	NP	NS	New Union - Social Liberals	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
René	van der LINDEN	NL	NP	CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	5	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Frans	TIMMERMANS	NL	NP	PvdA	Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Jan Jacob	VAN DIJK	NL	NP	CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	5	EPP	Not in Working Group
Wim	VAN EEKELEN	NL	NP	VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	4	ELDR	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Alberto	COSTA	P	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Guilherme	d'OLIVEIRA MARTINS	P	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Not in Working Group
Proinsias	DE ROSSA	IRL	NP	Lab	Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"





Explaining Actor Preferences

Model (Example)

Logit (π) = α

- + β_1 government left-right position
- + β_2 length EU membership
- + β_3 population size
- + β_4 EU net budget status
- + β_5 support for European integration
- + β_6 unemployment
- + ε

Operationalization of Independent Variables

Left-Right Position

- Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver (2005), *Party Policy in Modern Democracies: Location of domestic political parties* on scale 1 to 20;
- Alternative assessment: results of expert surveys Marks and Steenbergen (2004), Ray, Marks and Steenbergen (2002) for earlier data;
- Information about **government composition** during the time the DOSEI interviews were held: left-right position of each governmental party (according to Benoit and Laver) weighted by number of cabinet posts held.

Austria

28-Feb-03

ÖVP	Austrian People' Party	8	66.67
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria	3	25.00
SPÖ	Social Democratic Party of Austria		
GA	The Greens		
parteilos		1	8.33
		12	100.00

Government left-right position:
 $(8*14.30+3*17.38) / 11 = 15.14$

Germany

22-Oct-02

SPD	Social-Democratic Party	11	78.57
G	The Greens	3	21.43
		14	100.00

Government left-right position:

$$(11*8.4+3*7.1) / 14 = 8.12$$

Italy	beginning 95 - 17 may 1996*	Domestic Political Party	---			
	17 may 1996 - 28 okt 98	PDS	0.3	1999	9	0.385555556
		PPI	0.48	1999	4	
		UD	0.5	1999	1	
		RI	0.48	1999	3	
		Greens	0.38	1999	1	
		independents			3	
	28 okt 98 - 21 dec 99	PDS	0.3	1999	8	0.382
		PPI	0.48	1999	7	
		UDR	0.5	1999	3	
		Greens	0.38	1999	2	
		PDCI	0.06	1999	2	
		RI	0.48	1999	2	
		SDI	0.45	1999	1	
		independents			2	
	21 dec 99 - 28 april 2000	DS	0.3	1999	9	0.369130435
		PPI	0.48	1999	5	
		UDEUR	0.56	2002	2	
		Greens	0.38	1999	2	
		PDCI	0.06	1999	2	
		RI	0.48	1999	2	
		DEM	0.43	1999	1	
		independents			2	
	28 april 2000 - 11 june 2001	DS	0.3	1999	7	0.374545455
		PPI	0.48	1999	4	
		UDEUR	0.56	2002	2	
		Greens	0.38	1999	2	
		PDCI	0.06	1999	2	
		RI	0.48	1999	1	
		DEM	0.43	1999	3	
		SDI	0.45	1999	1	
		independents			3	
	11 juni 2001 - end 2004	FI	0.69	2002	10	0.7155
		AN	0.78	2002	5	
		LN	0.77	2002	3	
		CCD-CDU	0.6	2002	2	
		independents			5	

Length of EU Membership

- measured in years

- alternative:

 - founding members (code 1);

 - members since 1973 (code 2);

 - members since 1981/1986 (code 3);

 - members since 1995 (code 4);

 - members since 2004 (code 5).

Support for European Integration


- Rates of domestic support for European integration, e.g. as derived from Eurobarometer data;
- For example, the percentage of respondents (public opinion) indicating that the EU is a 'good thing' versus those claiming it is a 'bad thing' in each EU member state.

Net Budget Status

- Net receipts or payments (EU budget), for example as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI)
- Alternative: GDP per capita or PPP

Selected Results

Figure 1: Support for European Integration (Public Opinion) and Government Left-Right Positioning



*Questions Concerning to Council Decision Rules and Legislative Provisions
in the European Constitution (DOSEI Data Set)*


Item DOSEI Questionnaire	Wording of DOSEI Interview Question	Respondent Answer Categories	
		Category	Corresponding Answer
Voting threshold for qualified majority voting (Question 8)	Which voting threshold does the [government / EP / Commission] prefer for qualified majority voting in the Council?	5	A simple majority of member states and a simple majority of the population
		4	A simple majority of member states and three-fifth of the population
		3	A 60/60 threshold
		2	75% or more of member states and a specific majority of the population
		1	The Nice Treaty model: 1. 72% of the qualified-majority votes; 2. a majority of member states; 3. 62% of the population.

Explaining Preferences for the Decision Threshold in the Council (Ordered Probit Regression)

Preferred Decision Rule in the Council
(Choice 1: least inclusive; choice 5: most
inclusive; see table 1)

Explanatory variables	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Probability
Government Left-Right Position (Benoit-Laver)	-.090 (.091)	0.323
Length of EU membership (in Years)	.057 (.025)	0.025
Support for European Integration in Domestic Politics (2003)	-.025 (.016)	0.124
Net Budget Status (2003)	.630 (.353)	0.074
Population Size (in million, 2003)	-.022 (.016)	0.180
Unemployment (2003)	-.110 (.092)	0.232
Cut-off score 1	-2.829	1.408
Cut-off score 2	-2.505	1.399
Cut-off score 3	-1.305	1.371
Log likelihood	-26.67	
LR chi2(6)	10.80	
Prob > chi2	0.095	
Pseudo R ²	0.168	
n	25	

Means Plot 'Length of EU Membership' and Preferred Decision Threshold for the Council of the EU



Legislative procedure / majority voting (Questions 18a and 18b)	What is the [government's / EP's / Commission's] position on the role of the parliament and the voting rule in the Council in the following policy areas?		
<i>Question 18a:</i>		2	Yes
<i>Majority Voting:</i>		1	No (=unanimity)
Question 18a.1	Agriculture	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.2	Structural and cohesion policies	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.3	Area of freedom, security and justice	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.4	Internal market	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.5	Tax harmonization	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.6	Monetary policy (for the Euro states)	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.7	Economic policy	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.8	Employment policy	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.9	Social policy	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.10	Social security rights	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.11	Common foreign policy	2	Yes
		1	No
Question 18a.12	Defence policy	2	Yes
		1	No

Explaining Preferences for QMV Instead of Unanimity (Logit Regression)

DOSEI Questions 18.a 1 through
18.a12

Explanatory variables	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Probability
Government Left-Right Position (Laver, Hunt, Benoit)	-.050 (.045)	.271
Length of EU membership (in Years)	.032 (.013)	.014
Support for European Integration in Domestic Politics (2003)	-.012 (.009)	.019
Net Budget Status (2003)	.013 (.167)	.936
Population Size (in millions, 2003)	.003 (.009)	.778
Unemployment (2003)	-.000 (.040)	.997
Constant	1.381 (.677)	0.041
Log likelihood	-175.128	
LR Chi2(6)	17.96	
Prob > Chi2	0.0063	
Pseudo R ²	0.0488	
n	300	

<i>Question 18b: Co-equal EP:</i>			Yes (=codecision) No
Question 18b.1	Agriculture	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.2	Structural and cohesion policies	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.3	Area of freedom, security and justice	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.4	Internal market	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.5	Tax harmonization	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.6	Monetary policy (for the Euro states)	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.7	Economic policy	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.8	Employment policy	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.9	Social policy	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.10	Social security rights	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.11	Common foreign policy	2 1	Yes No
Question 18b.12	Defence policy	2 1	Yes No

Explaining Preferences for an Increased Leverage of the European Parliament in Legislative Decision-Making (Logit Regression)

Questions 18.b1 through 18.b12

Explanatory variables	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Probability
Government Left-Right Position (Benoit-Laver)	-.024 (.022)	.268
Length of EU membership (in Years)	.002 (.006)	.795
Support for European Integration in Domestic Politics (2003)	-.003 (.004)	.486
Net Budget Status (2003)	-.156 (.090)	.082
Population Size (in millions, 2003)	-.008 (.004)	.053
Unemployment (2003)	.029 (.021)	.163
Constant	.435 (.343)	.205
Log likelihood	-254.703	
LR Chi2(6)	9.86	
Prob > Chi2	.131	
Pseudo R ²	.019	
n	375	

Distance to Negotiation Outcomes

**Correlations Standardized Distance to Negotiation Outcome
with Independent Variables**

		Standardized Distance
Left_right_LHB	Pearson Correlation	-,052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,599
	N	104
EU_support	Pearson Correlation	,097
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,337
	N	100
Pop_size	Pearson Correlation	-,292(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,001
	N	121
Budget_rel	Pearson Correlation	,242(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,008
	N	121
Membership_length	Pearson Correlation	,329(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
	N	121
Standardized Distance	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	139

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).